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We investigate the inﬂuence of international interest rate changes on the Dublin
inter bank money market rates (Dibor). Speciﬁcally, we analyse the impact of
(un)expected changes in German(Euro) area and US policy rates on various
Dibor rates between 1991 to 2002 in an event type study. Our decomposition
of (un)expected changes of policy rates are based on future markets and is
akin to Kuttner (2000). Overall, our results suggest that Dibor rates respond
positively and signiﬁcantly to unanticipated Euro and US policy rate changes
while expected changes have an insigniﬁcant impact.
JEL classiﬁcation: E4; G1
Keywords: Monetary policy; interest rates.1 Introduction
The last decade has witnessed the primacy of monetary policy as the main instru-
ment in the stabilisation of inﬂation and output. The response of market interest
rates to changes in monetary policy has been of interest to researchers for a long
time. Moreover, with the recent introduction of the single European currency, in-
creased attention has been paid to the relationship between monetary policy and
asset prices (see ECB Monthly Bulletin, February 2002).
Given, Ireland is a small open economy, factors outside the country are likely
to play a large role in determining economic conditions within the economy.1 With
the advent of EMU, Irish monetary policy is now determined at a european level.
In addition, with greater ﬁnancial integration, it is likely that global monetary
conditions will also have an important inﬂuence on economies such as Ireland.
There is a large literature that examines the inﬂuence of policy rate changes on
market interest rates at various maturities. How policy rate changes aﬀect the term
structure of interest rates is critical to the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy. In this
note we examine the inﬂuence of international policy rate changes on the Dublin
wholesale money market. In an event type study, we examine the same day impact
of changes in German(Euro) and US policy rates on various Dublin interbank oﬀer
rates (Dibor rates) ranging in maturity between 1 week and 12 months.2
The extent to which market interest rates respond to policy changes will also be
inﬂuenced by whether such policy changes are perceived to be anticipated or not.
Early studies examining this relationship were unable to ﬁnd a consistent results
due to a failure to distinguish between expected and unexpected components of
policy changes, see for example, Cook & Hahn (1989) and Roley & Sellon (1995).
The decomposition of policy rate changes into anticipated and unanticipated
components is a diﬃcult task. One possibility is to statistically model expectations
using either an univariate or multivariate approach. An example of this approach is
the use of vector autoregressions (VAR), where the unanticipated exogenous change
in the policy instrument is identiﬁed and its eﬀects on various asset prices can then
be examined via impulse response functions over the short to medium term. Evans
1Research, for example, by Gallagher (1995) and Gallagher & Twomey (1998) have investigated
linkages between Irish and international stock market.
2Lack of data at a daily frequency prohibit looking at longer maturities.
1& Marshall (1998) and Wu (2002) use this approach for US data. 3The diﬃculty,
however, of such an approach is that the modeller may omit information that market
participants utilise in forming their expectations. In addition, Rudebusch (1998)
and Cochrane & Piazzesi (2002) have questioned the validity of the VAR generated
shock on the grounds that it is some what artiﬁcial. An alternative approach is
to use survey methods to assess market participants expectations of the variable of
interest. A diﬃculty with this approach is that surveys are done on a discrete basis
i.e. monthly or weekly. It may be preferable to have a more continous measure of
market expectations. A third possibility is to use futures markets to derive market
expectations and this the approach used in this note.
We decompose policy rate changes into their (un)expected components based
on the approach advocated by Kuttner (2001) and others who argue that one day
changes in future interest rates can act as a proxy for the unanticipated change in
policy rates. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 provides a
brief literature review while section 3 discusses the methodology used and section 4
reports the results. Finally, section 5 provides a brief conclusion.
2 Literature Review
There is a large literature that investigates the impact of US target rate changes on
market rates. Early papers failed to distinguish between expected and unexpected
policy rate changes. A typical example using the event study approach is that of
Cook & Hahn (1989) who ran the following regression
∆Rt = α0 + α1∆˜ rt + t. (1)
They examined the impact of changes in monetary policy on Treasury securities
and found that policy rate changes led to increases in treasury rates particularly
at the short end of the market. A one percentage point increase in the Fed funds
rate resulted in a 55 basis points increase in the 3 month T-bill rate. The impact at
the longer end of the maturity spectrum was considerably smaller, with only a 10
basis point increase for the 30 year bond. Roley & Sellon (1995) adopted a similar
3Both Wu (2002) and Evans & Marshall (1998) ﬁnd that the impact of an exogenous monetary
policy shock on interest rates falls as we move out the maturity spectrum.
2approach to that of Cook & Hahn (1989), for the period 1987 to 1995. Their study
found that rates increased by a statistically insigniﬁcant four basis points as a result
of an increase of 1 per cent in the target rate.
However, empirical work that fails to decompose monetary policy changes into
its expected and unexpected components are likely to lead to biased results due
to an errors in variable problem. In particular, a number of theories based on the
assumption of eﬃcient markets would suggest that only unanticipated changes in
the policy instrument should inﬂuence asset prices while anticipated changes should
have no eﬀect as such information should have already been priced into the asset
by the market. Studies that examine the inﬂuence of policy rate changes and fail
to decompose actual changes into these two components are liable to lead to biased
results.
The decomposition of policy changes into anticipated and unanticipated compo-
nents is a diﬃcult problem. Fortunately, with the increasing use of future markets,
it is potentially easier to derive market expectations of policy variables. Recent
studies that have used federal funds futures to decompose policy changes into an-
ticipated and unanticipated, include Kuttner (2001) and Poole & Rasche (2000).4
Kuttner (2001) analyses the impact of unanticipated changes in the fed funds
target rate on treasury bill, note and bond yields
∆Rt = α + β1∆˜ re
t + β2∆˜ ru
t + t (2)
where ∆˜ ru
t is the one day surprise; and ∆˜ re
t is the expected change in the





m is the number of days in the month, t is the day of the announcement, f0
s,t is
the spot month federal funds future rate on day t of month s while f0
s,t−1 is the
previous day’s value. Kuttner’s (2001) sample runs from June 1989 to February
2000 and he ﬁnds a very small insigniﬁcant relationship between interest rates and
anticipated target rate changes, but a large and highly signiﬁcant relationship with
unanticipated target changes. In addition, he ﬁnds the response of interest rates
4If on day t, the players in the futures market expected a change in Fed policy on day t+1 and
no further changes were anticipated. Then the federal funds futures rate on day t of month s, f
0
s,t,
would encompass the average of realized funds through that date and expectations about rates
after that date.
3from 1 to 12 month maturities to policy surprises to be of similar magnitude. Poole
& Rasche (2000) and Cochrane & Piazzesi (2002) ﬁnd similar results to Kuttner
(2001). 5 Ehrmann & Fratzscher (2002), using survey data, examine the inﬂuence
of unexpected changes in policy rates for both the US and Germany/Euro area on
money market rates in both the US and Germany/Euro area.
3 Methodology
Drawing on Kuttner’s (2001) approach, we initially run the following baseline re-
gression;
∆Dibort = α0 + α1∆Re
t + α2∆Ru
t + t (3)
where
∆ Dibort is the one day change in the relevant Dibor rate between t and t+1
∆Ru
t is the one day change in the futures rate on day t of a change in the policy
target rate and acts as a proxy for a policy rate surprise
∆Re
t is a proxy of the expected change in the policy rate target at date t
The expected change in the policy rate is calculated as the diﬀerence between
the actual policy rate target and the change in the futures contract on the day of the
change. For the US, we use the one day change in federal funds futures contract as
our proxy of the policy rate surprise. One problem in examining Germany or Euro
policy rates is that there is no equivalent futures market instrument that tracks
German or Euro area policy rates as compared to the federal funds future contract.
However, there are interest rate future contracts that can act as close substitutes
since they are likely to be strongly inﬂuenced by current expectations of future
policy rates.
Our proxy for the unanticipated change in the German interest rate between
1991 and 1998 is the one day change in the 3 month Euro mark futures rate. With
5Poole & Rasche (2000) use the 1 month ahead futures contract as a proxy for the unanticipated
element of policy rate change while Cochrane & Piazzesi (2002) use the euro dollar contract.
4the introduction of the Euro in January 1999, we proxy surprise changes in Euro
rates by the one day change in the 3 month Euribor futures rate.6
4 Data and Empirical Results
4.1 Data
In table 1 and the appendix, we give a detailed explanation of our data and sources
they were drawn from.
4.2 Empirical Results
We ﬁrst examine the impact of German and Euro policy rates on market rates in
Dublin. We combine together the unanticipated changes in German and Euro policy
rate changes based on the one day change in the 3 month mark and euribor futures
respectively. The results for the baseline regression are reported in table 2. Overall,
our results suggest unanticipated changes in German & Euro policy rates give rise
to a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on most Dibor rates while anticipated changes have
a statistically insigniﬁcant eﬀect.
However, given the change in monetary arrangements from a quasi-ﬁxed ex-
change rate to a monetary union, it is likely that the response of policy rate changes
for Germany and the Euro area on Dibor rates is likely to diﬀer. To examine this
possibility we separate the inﬂuence of German and Euro rates to see whether there
has been a change in this relationship with the introduction of the Euro.
In table 3, we ﬁnd that with the onset of the Euro, an unanticipated change in
Euro policy rate leads to a positive signiﬁcant impact on all Dibor rates. Moreover,
a shock to the Euro policy rate appears to give rise to at least a one for one change in
all Dibor maturities examined. Hypothesis tests cannot reject a coeﬃcient equal to
unity associated with an unexpected change in the ECB policy rate. Thus, wholesale
money market rates in Dublin appear to respond one for one to unexpected changes
in the Euro area policy rate. On the other hand, expected changes in the ECB policy
rate do not give rise to a signiﬁcant response. The ﬁnding of a lack of signﬁcance of
expected changes in the policy rate are in accordance with Kuttner’s (2001) work
6Euribor stands for Euro Interbank Oﬀered Rate.
5on the US.
Prior to the onset of EMU, neither (un)anticipated changes in the German policy
rate give rise to a signiﬁcant positive inﬂuence on Dibor rates. These diverging
results can be rationalised on the basis that in a monetary union, money market
rates in Dublin should be in line with Euro policy rate. While under the ERM,
there was some scope for diﬀerent monetary policies given the exchange rate was
only quasi ﬁxed and hence Irish money market rates could diverge from German
rates.7
In table 4, we report results for diﬀerent Dibor rates for (un)anticipated changes
in the US federal funds rate target. Our proxy for the unanticipated change is the
one day change in the Fed funds future rate contract.8 Overall, an unanticipated
change in the Fed funds rate target leads to a signiﬁcant positive response across
most Dibor maturities while an expected change is not statistically signiﬁcant. Not
surprising, we ﬁnd the magnitude of unanticipated component is much lower for US
relative to Euro area policy changes.
While the ﬁnding that unexpected changes in the US policy rate can inﬂuence
wholesale money market rates in Dublin may seem surprising, it seems to point
to the importance of US monetary policy leading other countries monetary policy.
Research by Ehrmann & Fratzscher (2002) also ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of US monetary
surprises on German and Euro Area market rates but ﬁnd much less evidence of
causation running in the opposite direction.9
Overall, our results appear to be consistent with the eﬃcient markets hypothe-
sis, which suggests that only unanticipated changes in the policy instrument should
inﬂuence asset prices while anticipated changes should have no eﬀect as such infor-
mation should have already been priced into the asset by the market.
5 Conclusions
We have investigated the inﬂuence of international interest rates on Dublin inter-
bank money market rates (dibor). Consistent with a number of recent studies on
7We are unable to examine the impact of (un)anticipated changes in the domestic Irish policy
rate prior to EMU due to the lack of a futures market for Ireland.
8As in Poole & Rasche (2000), we use the one month ahead federal funds future’s contract.
9These authors don’t report results for expected changes in the policy rate.
6US data, we use an event study approach taking into account (un)anticipated policy
rate changes. Our main ﬁnding is that there is a strong relationship between surprise
Euro area policy rate changes and market rates in Ireland while US policy surprises
also have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence. On the other hand, expected policy rate changes
are not statistically signiﬁcant. In all cases our results appear to be consistent with
the eﬃcient markets hypothesis, which suggests that only unanticipated changes in
the policy instrument should inﬂuence asset prices while anticipated changes should
have no eﬀect as such information should have already been priced into the asset by
the market. Further work might explore more closely the link between US policy
changes and European interest rates.
6 Appendix
6.1 Data
The data set is taken from various sources, including Datastream, Bloomberg, Fed-
eral Reserve Board of Governors, Deutsche Bundesbank and the Central Bank of
Ireland. The sample period runs from July 1991 to October 2002. The actual
change in the federal funds target rate is obtained from the Federal Reserve Board
of Governors. The unanticipated change in the federal funds target rate is proxied
by both the 1-day change in the price of the 1-month ahead 30-day Federal Funds
futures contract, as traded on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT).10
Actual changes used for German and Euro policy rate are changes in the Bundes-
bank base rate (Lombard rate) until December 1998 and the ECB main reﬁnancing
rate for the remainder of the sample. These rates are taken from the Deutsche Bun-
desbank and the ECB respectively. The unanticipated change in the Bundesbank
base rate is proxied by the 1-day change in the price of the Short EuroDM futures
contract as traded on the London International Financial Futures and Options Ex-
change (LIFFE). The unanticipated change in the ECB reﬁnancing rate is proxied
by the 1-day change in the price of the EUX 3-month euribor futures contract as
10The change is Ft − Ft−1, where t is the day of the policy announcement. The change in
the Dibor rates (data taken from Bloomberg) must take account of the time diﬀerence between
the US and Ireland and hence is calculated as (Pt+1 − Pt)/Pt, where t is the day of the policy
announcement.
7traded on Eurex, Frankfurt. In both cases the unanticipated change is calculated
as Ft − Ft−1, where t is the date of the policy announcement. The data are taken
from Datastream and Bloomberg respectively.
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9Table 1: Data Description
Origin of Event Proxy for Unanticipated Target Sample
Change
US 1-month ahead 30-day Federal funds 1991:10 -
federal funds target rate 2002:9
futures rate
German/euro 3-month euromark & Lombard rate & ECB 1991:10 -
euribor futures rate main reﬁnancing rate 2002:9
10Table 2: Expected & Unexpected Change in German & Euro Policy Rate
on Dibor rates




1 week 1 month 2 month 3 month 6 month 9 month 12 month
α0 0.011 0.060 0.012 0.002 0.006 0.007 -0.003
(0.44) (1.22) (0.59) (0.12) (0.33) (0.33) (-0.12)
α1 0.74 0.147 0.028 0.031 0.028 0.029 0.038
(1.50) (1.47) (0.69) (0.74) (0.77) (0.74) (0.88)
α2 0.952 1.015 1.016 0.86 0.786 0.761 0.654
(3.78) (1.99) (4.97) (4.05) (4.26) (3.76) (2.97)
Diagnostics††
¯ R2 0.35 0.13 0.47 0.36 0.39 0.32 0.22
D.W. 2.13 1.40 1.98 2.40 2.22 2.50 2.50
HET 6.79 1.49 3.50 3.26 2.02 2.88 2.93
(0.24) (0.91) (0.62) (0.66) (0.85) (0.72) (0.71)
Note: Using one day change in 3 month mark and euribor future contract as
unanticipated change.
† Terms in brackets under coeﬃcients refer to coeﬃcients t-stats.
††In all regressions reported DW stands for the Durbin Watson statistic while HET
is White’s (1980) test for heteroscedasticity. The associated p value is in brackets.
11Table 3: Expected & Unexpected Change in German & Euro Policy Rate
on Dibor rates allowing for Structural Change






1 week 1 month 2 month 3 month 6 month 9 month 12 month
α0 0.008 0.081 0.008 0.001 0.005 0.008 0.080
(0.34) (1.50) (0.39) (0.07) (0.28) (0.39) (0.93)
α1 0.010 0.241 -0.017 -0.003 -0.001 0.013 0.030
(0.14) (1.44) (-0.26) (-0.05) (-0.01) (0.20) (0.46)
α2 -0.196 0.363 0.421 0.142 0.178 0.143 -0.160
(-0.47) (0.37) (1.10) (0.36) (0.53) (0.38) (-0.42)
α3 0.072 0.064 0.033 0.026 0.023 0.017 0.013
(0.71) (0.51) (0.68) (0.51) (0.54) (0.36) (0.27)
α4 1.366 1.465 1.21 1.132 1.014 1.012 1.009
(3.21) (2.35) (5.00) (4.62) (4.75) (4.28) (4.14)
Diagnostics††
¯ R2 0.52 0.12 0.50 0.43 0.45 0.38 0.36
D.W. 0.88 1.44 1.82 2.23 2.36 2.70 2.32
HET 6.30 6.02 4.46 4.13 3.02 4.35 6.18
(0.96) (0.97) (0.99) (0.99) (0.99) (0.99) (0.96)
Using one day change in 3 month mark and euribor futures contract as unantici-
pated change.
† Terms in brackets under coeﬃcients refer to coeﬃcients t-stats.
††In all regressions reported DW stands for the Durbin Watson statistic while HET
is White’s (1980) test for heteroscedasticity. The associated p value is in brackets.
12Table 4: Expected & Unexpected Change in Federal Funds Rate on
Dibor rates using US Fed Funds Futures




1 week 1 month 2 month 3 month 6 month 9 month 12 month
α0 -0.006 -0.008 -0.007 -0.013 -0.008 -0.004 -0.007
(-0.34) (-0.59) (-0.59) (-1.06) (-0.67) (-0.39) (-0.71)
α1 0.017 0.031 0.047 0.041 0.035 0.041 0.025
(0.31) (0.69) (1.15) (1.03) (0.87) (1.16) (0.72)
α2 0.281 0.214 0.144 0.184 0.260 0.258 0.256
(2.16) (1.99) (1.46) (1.93) (2.65) (3.06) (3.13)
Diagnostics††
¯ R2 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.19 0.26 2.32
D.W. 1.91 1.76 1.92 1.99 2.03 2.03 1.91
HET 5.20 5.58 5.55 5.72 5.07 2.90 2.82
(0.39) (0.35) (0.35) (0.33) (0.41) (0.71) (0.73)
Using one day change in 1 month ahead federal funds future contract as unantici-
pated change. † Terms in brackets under coeﬃcients refer to coeﬃcients t-stats.
††In all regressions reported DW stands for the Durbin Watson statistic while HET
is White’s (1980) test for heteroscedasticity. The associated p value is in brackets.
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